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II E  r  0  11  T 


ROANOKE  ISLAND 


INVESTIGATION  COMMITTEE. 


RICHMOND: 

ENQUIRER     BOOK      AN'  I)     JOB       PRESS 
TYLKR,  WISE,  ALLEORE  &.  SMITH. 
1S62, 


« 


EErORT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE. 


The  Committee,  to  whom  was  referred  a  resolution  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  instructing  them  "  to  enquire 
and  report  the  causes  and  circumstances  of  the  capituhxtion 
of  Roanoke  Ishmd,-'  have  had  tlic  same  under  consideration  ; 
and  have  given  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  connected 
-with  the  defences  of  the  said  Island  and  its  adjacent  waters, 
and  of  the  capitulation  on  the  8th  of  February,  a  most 
elaborate  investigation. 

The  Committee  find,  that  on  the  21st  day  of  August, 
1861,  Brig.  General  Gatlin  Avas  ordered  to  the  command  of 
the  Department  of  Kortli  Carolina,  and  the  coast  defences 
of  that  State.  On  tlie  29th  of  September,  Brig.  General 
D,  II.  Hill  was  assigned  to  duty  in  North  Carolina,  and 
charged  with  the  defences  of  that  portion  of  said  State,  ly- 
ing between  Albemarle  Sound  and  the  Ncuse  river  and  Pam- 
lico Sound,  including  those  waters,  and  was  directed  to  re- 
port to  Brig.  Gen,  Gatlin. 

On  the  16th  of  November,  Brig.  GenT  L.  0.  Branch  was 
directed  to  relieve  Brig.  General  Hill,  in  command  of  his 
district  in  North  Carolina.  On  the  21st  of  Deccmbu',  that 
part  of  North  Carolina  east  of  the  Chowan  river,  together 
■with  the  counties  of  Washington  and  Tyrrell,  was,  at  the 
request  of  the  proper  authorities  of  North  Carolina,  sepa- 
rated from  the  remainder,  and  constituted  into  a  Military 
District,  under  Brig.  Gen'l  II.  A.  Wise,  and  attached  to 
the  command  of  Major  Gen'l  Huger,  commanding  the  De- 
partment of  Norfolk.  At  the  time,  therefore,  of  the  sur- 
render of  Roanoke  Island,  on  the  8th  of  February,  1862,  it 
was  within  the  Military  District  of  Brig.  General  Wise,  and 
attached  to  the  command  of  Mnjor  Gcnl  Huger. 

The  military  defences  of  Roanoke  Island  and  its  adjacent 
\Tatcrs,  on  the  said  Sth  of  February,  1862,  consisted  of 
Fort  Bartow,  the  most  Southern  of  the  defences  on  the  west 
side  of  the  Island — a  sand  fort,  well  covered  with  turf,  hav- 


ing  six  long  32-pountIer  guns  in  emln-asure,  and  three  32- 
pounders  en  barbette.  The  next  is  Fort  Bl.anchard,  on  the 
same  side  of  the  Island,  about  two  and  one-half  miles  from 
Fort  Bartow — a  semi-circular  sand  fort,  turfed,  and  mount- 
ing four  3i-ponnders  en  barbette.  Next,  on  the  same  side, 
and  about  twelve  hundred  yards  from  Fort  Blanchard,  is 
Fort  Iluger.  This  is  a  turfed  sand  fort,  running  along  the 
line  of  the  beach,  and  closed  in  the  rear  by  a  low  breast- 
work, with  a  barquette  for  infantry.  It  contained  eight  32- 
pounder  guns  in  embrasure,  two  rifled  32-pounders  en  bar- 
bette, and  two  small  32-pounders  en  barbette  on  the  right. 

About  three  miles  below  Fort  Bartow,  on  the  east  side 
of  the  Island,  was  a  battery  of  two  32-pounder  guns  en 
barbette,  at  a  point  known  as  Midgctt's  Hammock.  In  the 
centre  of  the  Island,  about  two  miles  from  Fort  Bartow, 
and  a  mile  from  Midgett's  Hammock,  was  a  redoubt  or 
breast-work,  thrown  across  the  road,  about  70  or  80  feet 
long,  with  embrasures  for  three  guns,  on  the  right  of  which 
was  a  swamp,  on  the  left  a  marsh — the  redoubt  reaching 
nearly  between  them  and  facing  to  the  South.  On  the  Tyr- 
rell side,  on  the  main  land,  nearly  opposite  to  Fort  Iluger, 
was  Fort  Forrest,  mounting  seven  32-pounders. 

In  addition  to  these  defences  on  the  shore  and  on  the  Is- 
land, there  was  a  barrier  of  piles,  extending  from  the  east 
side  of  Fulker  shoals,  towards  the  Island.  Its  object  was 
to  compel  vessels  passing  on  the  west  of  the  Island  to  ap- 
proach Avithin  reach  of  the  shore  batteries;  but  up  to  the 
8th  of  February,  there  was  a  span  of  1,700  yards  open  op- 
posite to  Fort  Bartow.  Some  vessels  had  been  sunk,  and 
piles  driven  on  the  west  side  of  Fulker  shoals,  to  obstruct 
the  channel  between  that  shoal  and  the  main  land — which 
comprise  all  the  defences,  either  upon  the  land  or  in  the 
waters  adjacent. 

The  entire  military  force  stationed  upon  the  Island  prior 
to,  and  at  the  time  of,  the  late  engagement,  consisted  of  the 
8th  Regiment  of  N.  C.  State  Troops,  under  the  command  of 
Col.  H'.  M.  Shaw,  the  31st  Regiment  of  N.  C.  Volunteers, 
under  the  command  of  Col.  J.  V.  Jordan,  and  three  compa- 
nies of  the  17th  N.  C.  Troops,  under  the  command  of  Maj. 
G.  H.  Hill.  After  manning  the  several  Forts,  en  the  7th 
of  February,  there  were  but  one  thousand  and  twenty-four 
men  left,  and  two  hundred  of  them  were  upon  the  sick  list. 
On  the  evening  of  the  7th  of  February,  Brig.  Gcn'l  Wise 
sent  from  Nagg's  Head,  under  the  command  of  Lt,  Colonel 


Anderson,  a  reinforcement,  numbering  some  450  men.  This 
does  not  include  the  commands  of  Lt.  Col.  Green  and  Major 
Fry,  both  of  Avhora  marched  to  the  scene  of  action  after  the 
battle  was  closed.  The  committee  do  not  think  there  was 
any  intentional  delay  in  the  landing  of  the  commands  of 
Col.  Green  and  Major  Fry.  The  former.  Col,  Green,  ex- 
hibited great  anxiety  to  get  into  the  fight,  vdien  lie  did  land, 
and  acted  with  great  gallantry  in  the  skirmish  he  did  have 
with  the  enemy  in  the  vicinty  of  the  camp. 

The  whole  under  the  command  of  Brig.  Gen.  Wise,  who, 
upon  the  7th  and  8th  February,  was  at  Nagg's  Head,  four 
miles  distant  from  the  Island,  confined  to  a  sick  bed,  and 
entirely  disabled  from  participating  in  the  action  in  person. 
The  immediate  command,  therefore,  devolved  upon  Col.  II. 
M.  Shaw,  the  senior  officer  present. 

On  the  Gth  of  February,  it  was  discovered  by  the  compa- 
nies on  picket  duty  on  the  south  end  of  the  Island,  that  the 
enemy's  fleet  was  in  Pamlico  Sound,  south  of  Roanoke  Is- 
land, and,  apparently,  intending  to  attack  the  forces  upon 
the  Island.  Col.  Shaw  immediately  communicated  the  f\ict 
to  Brig.  Gen'l  Wise,  and  issued  orders  for  the  disposition  of 
his  troops  preparatory  to  an  engagement.  The  points  at 
which  it  was  supposed  the  enemy  would  attempt  to  land 
troops  were  Ashby's  and  Pugh's  landings.  Ashhy's  is  sit- 
uate on  the  west  side  of  the  Island,  about  two  miles  south 
of  Fort  Bartow ;  andPugh's  on  the  same  side,  about  two 
miles  south  of  Ashby's. 

On  the  night  of  the  Gth,  or  early  in  the  morning  of  the 
7th, -a  detachment,  with  one  piece  of  artillery,  was  sent  to 
Pugh's  landing,  and  one,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  was 
sent  to  Ashby's,  and  the  remainder  of  the  forces  was  sta- 
tioned in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Ashby's.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  7th,  the  enemy's  fleet  passed  by  both  of  the  land- 
ings, and  proceeded  towards  Fort  Bartow  ;  and  the  detach- 
ment of  infantry,  stationed  at  Pugh's,  immediately  fell  back 
to  the  vicinity  of  Ashby's  landing,  and  joined  the  detach- 
ments there — all  under  command  of  Col.  J.  V.  Jordan. 

In  the  sound,  between  Roanoke  Island  and  the  main  land, 
upon  the  Tyrrell  side.  Commodore  Lynch  Avith  his  scjuadron 
of  seven  vessels  had  taken  position,  and  at  1 1  o'clock  the 
enemy's  fleet,  consisting  of  about  30  gunboats  and  schoon- 
ers, advanced  in  ten  divisions — the  rear  one  having  the 
schooners  and  transports  in  tow.  The  advance  and  attack- 
ing division  again  subdivided — one  assailing  the  squadron 


and  the  other  firing  upon  the  fort,  witli  nine  inch,  ten  inch 
and  eleven  inch  shell,  spherical  case,  a  few  round  shot  and 
every  variety  of  riHed  projectiles.  The  fort  replied  with 
but  four  guns  (which  were  all  that  could  be  brought  to  bear) 
and  after  striking  the  foremost  vessel  several  times,  the  fleet 
fell  back,  so  as  to  mask  one  of  the  guns  of  the  fort,  leaving 
but  three  to  reply  to  the  fire  of  the  whole  fleet.  The  bom- 
bardment was  continued  through  the  day,  and  the  enemy  re- 
tired at  dark.  The  squadron  under  the  command  of  Com- 
modore Lynch,  sustained  their  position  most  gallantly,  and 
only  retired,  after  exhausting  all  their  amniunilion,  and 
having  lost  the  steamer  Curlew  and- the  Forrest  disabled. 
Fort  Bartow  sustained  considerable  damage  from  the  fire  of 
the  day,  but  the  injuries  were  partially  repaired  by  the  next 
morning  and  the  fort  put  in  a  state  of  defence. 

About  3  1-2  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  the  ene- 
my sent  off  from  his  transports  about  twenty-five  men  in  a 
launch,  apparently  to  take  soundings,  who  were  fired  upon 
and  retreated;  whereupon  two  large  steamers  having  in  tow, 
each  thirty  boats,  filled  with  troops,  approached  the  Island, 
under  the  protection  of  their  gunboats,  at  a  point  north  of 
Ashby's  landing,  known  as  llayiuon's,  and  did  ellect  a  land- 
ing. The  point  selected  was  out  of  the  reach  of  the  field 
pieces  at  Ashby's,  and  defended  by  a  swamp  from  the  ad- 
vance of  our  infantry,  and  protected  by  the  shot  and  shell 
from  their  gunboats.  Our  whole  force  therefore  withdrew 
from  Ashby's  and  took  position  at  the  redoubt  or  breast- 
work, and  placed  in  battery,  their  field  pieces  with  necessa- 
ry artillerymen,  under  the  respective  commands  of  Captain 
Schemerhorn,  Lieutenants  Kinney  and  Seldon.  Two  com- 
panies of  the  Sth  and  two  of  the  31st  were  placed  at  the 
redoubt  to  su})port  the  artillery.  Three  companies  of  the 
Wise  Legion,  deployed  to  the  right  and  left  as  skirmishers. 
The  remainder  of  the  infantry,  in  position  3(J()  yards  in  the 
rear  of  the  redoubt  as  a  reserve. 

The  enemy  landed  some  fifteen  thousand  men,  with  artil- 
lery, and  at  7  o'clock,  A.  M.,  of  the  Sth  opened  fire  upon 
the  redoubt,  which  was  replied  to  imme<liately  with  great 
spirit,  and  the  action  soon  became  general,  and  was  contin- 
ued without  intermission  for  more  than  five  hours,  when  the 
enemy  succeeded  in  deploying  a  large  force  on  either  side  of 
our  line,  flanking  each  wing.  The  order  was  then  given  by 
Col.  Shaw  to  spike  the  guns  in  the  battery  and  to  retreat  to 
the  northern  eu<l  of  the  Island.  The  guns  were  spiked  and 
the  whole  force  fell  back  to  the  camps. 


During  tlie  engagement  at  tlie  redoubt,  the  enemy's  fleet 
attempted  to  advance  up  Croatan  Sound,  -which  brought  on  a 
desultory  engagement  between  Fort  Bartow  and  the  fleet, 
which  continued  up  to  half-after-twelve  o'clock,  when  the 
commanding  officer  was  informed  that  the  land  defences  had 
been  forced,  and  the  position  of  the  fort  turned.  He  there- 
fore ordered  the  guns  to  be  disabled  and  the  ammunition  des- 
troyed, which  was  done  and  the  fort  abandoned.  The  same 
thing  was  done  at  Forts  Blanchard  and  Hugcr ;  and  the 
forces  from  all  the  forts  were  marched  in  good  order  to  the 
camps.  Tlie  enemy  took  possession  of  the  redoubt  and 
forts,  immediately,  and  proceeded  in  pursuit  with  great  cau- 
tion towards  the  northern  end  of  the  Island  in  force,  deploy- 
ing so  as  to  surround  our  forces  at  the  camps.  Col.  Shaw 
having  arrived  with  his  whole  force  at  his  camp  in  time  to 
have  saved  his  whole  command,  if  transports  had  have  been 
furnished,  but  none  being  there,  and  finding  himself  sur- 
rounded by  a  greatly  superior  force  upon  the  open  Island, 
with  no  field  Avorks  to  protect  him  and  having  lost  his  only 
three  field  pieces  at  the  redoubt  had  either  to  make  an  idle 
display  of  courage  in  fighting  the  foe  at  such  immense  dis- 
advantage, to  the  sacrifice  of  his  command  or  to  capitulate 
and  surrender  as  prisoners  of  war.  lie  wisely  determined 
upon  the  latter  alternative. 

The  loss  on  our  side  in  killed  and  wounded  and  missing  is 
as  follows  :  Killed  23;  wounded  58  ;  missing  G2.  The  loss 
of  the  4Gth  and  59th  Virginia  Volunteers  is  killed  G ; 
wounded  28;  missing  19 — that  of  the  8th  and  3 1st  and  2nd 
North  Carolina  State  Troops  is  16  killed;  30  wounded;  43 
missing — of  the  engineers  department,  Lieut.  Seldon,  kill- 
ed, who  had  patriotically  volunteered  his  services  in  the  line, 
was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  six-pounder,  which  he 
handled  with  so  much  skill  as  to  produce  immense  havoc  in 
the  enemy's  ranks,  and  to  elicit  the  unbounded  admiration  of 
all  who  witnessed  it.  Unhappily,  however,  that  gallant  of- 
ficer received  a  rifle  ball  in  the  head,  and  he  fell  without  a 
groan. 

The  loss  of  the  enemy,  was  in  killed  and  wounded  at  least 
900,  and  the  probability  is,  a  much  larger  number. 

The  foregoing  is  a  brief  and  concise  view  of  the  defences 
of  Roanoke  Island  and  of  the  adjacent  waters  ;  the  number 
of  our  troops  engaged  on  the  7th  and  Sth  of  February  and 
the  circumstances  of  the  capitulation  thereof  on  the  8tli  of 
February.     The  committee  are  satisfied  that  Col.  Shaw  held 


8 

the  possession  of  that  post  as  long  as  he  could  have  done 
■without  a  useless  sacrifice  of  huraiin  life.  That  on  the  7th 
and  Sth,  the  officers  and  men  in  Fort  Bartow  displayed  great 
coolness  and  courage  and  persevering  effort  to  sustain  their 
position  and  drive  back  the  enemy's  fleet. 

In  the  battle  of  the  8th  of  February,  at  the  redoubt  the 
officers  and  men  exhibited  a  cool  and  deliberate  courage, 
worthy  of  veterans  in  the  service,  and  sustained  their  posi- 
tion under  an  uninterrupted  and  deadly  fire  for  more  than 
five  hours,  repulsing  the  enemy  in  three  separate  and 
distinct  charges  and  only  -withdrew  from  the  deadly  con- 
flict after  exhausting  their  ammunition  for  their  artillery, 
and  being  surrounded  and  flanked  by  more  than  ten  times 
their  number.  Instead  of  the  result  being  ^'deeply  humilia- 
ting,^^ it  was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  gallant  actions  of 
the  war,  and  in  the  language  of  their  absent  Commanding 
General  "both  officers  and  men  fought  firmly,  coolly,  effi- 
ciently and  as  long  as  humanity  would  allow." 

The  committee  are  satisfied  that  the  whole  command  did 
their  duty,  and  they  do  not  feel  at  liberty  to  designate  any 
particular  acts  of  companies  or  individuals.  But  in  simple 
justice  to  Col.  Shaw  (upon  whom  devolved  the  command  by 
reason  of  the  extreme  illness  of  his  superior.  General  Wise, 
and  who  has  been  censured  for  the  result)  the  committee 
take  pleasure  in  stating  that  there  is  no  foundation  for  any 
just  reflection  upon  him.  lie,  upon  the  7th  of  February, 
after  disposing  of  his  infantry  force,  and  finding  that  the 
enemy  did  not  intend  landing,  repaired  immediately,  in  per- 
son, to  Fort  Bartow,  where  the  bombardment  was  progress- 
ing, and  made  his  way  into  tlie  fort  amidst  the  most  immi- 
nent danger  from  shot  and  shell ;  and  there  remained,  en- 
couraging the  men  and  assisting  as  far  as  he  was  able,  until 
he  discovered  the  enemy  intended  to  effect  a  landing  below, 
when  he  left  the  fort,  under  the  same  dangerous  circum- 
stances of  the  morning,  to  take  command  of  the  infantry  in 
person  :  and  upon  tlie  8th  at  the  redoul)t,  he  commanded  in 
person,  sharing  the  dangers  of  his  men  for  more  than  five 
hours,  with  a  firmness,  coolness  and  bravery  worthy  of  the 
position  he  occupied. 

Immediately  upon  the  secession  of  the  State  of  North 
Carolina  from  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Confederate  States 
of  America,  the  authorities  of  that  State  commenced  the 
construction  of  fortifications  at  Ilatteras  and.  Oregon  Inlet, 


and  other  points  upon  her  coast,  which  were  not  completed 
when  the  State  transferred  her  forts,  arsenals,  army,  navy 
and  coast  defences  to  the  Confederate  Government.  Shortly 
thereafter  the  attack  was  made  upon  Forts  Ilattcras  and 
Clark,  and  tlicy  Avere  taken,  and  the  fortifications  at  Oregon 
Inlet  were  abandoned,  and  the  armament,  stores  and  ammu- 
nition were  removed  to  Roanoke  Island.  The  enemy  imme- 
diately appeared  in  force  in  Pamlico  Sound,  the  waters  of 
which  are  connected  with  Albemarle  and  Currituck  Sounds 
by  means  of  the  two  smaller  sounds  of  Croatan  and  Roa- 
noke. The  island  of  Roanoke  being  situated  between  these 
two  latter  souiuls,  commanding  the  channels  of  either,  be- 
came, upon  the  fall  of  Ilatteras  and  the  abandonment  of 
Oregon  Inlet,  only  second  in  importance  to  Fortress  INlon- 
roe.  That  island,  then,  became  the  key  which  unlocked  all 
Northeastern  North  Carolina  to  the  enemy,  and  exposed 
Portsmouth  and  Norfolk  to  a  rear  approach  of  the  most  im- 
minent danger.  In  the  language  of  Brigadier- General 
Wise,  "  That  such  is  the  importance  and  value,  in  a  mili- 
tary point  of  view,  of  Roanoke  Island  that  it  ought  to  have 
been  defended  by  all  the  means  in  the  power  of  the  Govern- 
ment. It  was  the  key  to  all  the  rear  defences  of  Norfolk. 
It  unlocked  two  sounds,  Albemarle  and  Currituck ;  eight 
rivers,  the  North,  West,  Pasquotank,  the  Pcrquimmons,  the 
Little,  the  Chowan,  the  Roanoke,  and  the  Alligator ;  four 
canals,  the  Albemarle  and  Chesapeake,  the  Dismal,  Swamp, 
the  Northwest  Canal  and  the  Sufiblk;  two  railroads,  the 
Petersburg  and  Norfolk,  and  the  Seaboard  and  Roanoke.  It 
guarded  more  than  four-fifths  of  all  Norfolk's  supplies  of 
corn,  pork  and  forage,  and  it  cut  the  command  of  General 
linger  oif  from  all  of  its  most  eificiont  transportation.  It 
endangers  the  subsistence  of  his  whole  army,  threatens  the 
navy-yard  at  Gosport,  and  to  cut  off  Norfolk  from  Rich- 
mond, and  both  from  railroad  communication  with  the  South. 
It  lodges  the  enemy  in  a  safe  harbor  from  the  storms  of 
Ilatteras,  gives  them  a  rendezvous  and  large  rich  range  of 
supplies,  and  the  command  of  the  seaboard  from  Oregon 
Inlet  to  Cape  Henry.  It  should  have  been  defended  at  the 
expense  of  twenty  thousand  men,  and  of  many  millions  of 
dollars." 

The  committee  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  island  of  Roa- 
noke was  a  military  post  of  great  importance  ;  that  it  might 
have  been  placed  in  a  state  of  defence  against  any  reasona- 
ble force,  with   the   expenditure  of  mouey  and  labor,  sup^ 


10 

posed  to  be  within  the  means  of  the  Government;  that  the 
same  was  not  done,  and  the  defences  constructed  were 
wholly  inadequate  for  its  protection  from  an  attack  either 
by  land  or  water.  And  the  committee  have  no  difficulty  in 
assigning,  as  the  cause  of  our  disaster  and  defeat  on  the  8th 
of  February,  the  want  of  the  necessary  defences  upon  the 
island  and  the  adjacent  waters,  and  upon  the  mainland  upon 
the  Tyrrell  side;  the  want  of  the  necessary  field  artillery, 
armament  and  ammunition,  and  the  great  and  unjiardonable 
deficiency  of  men,  together  with  the  entire  want  of  trans- 
portation, by  which  the  whole  command  might  have  been 
conveyed  from  the  island  after  the  defeat  at  the  battery. 

But  the  couimittee  have  had  much  difficulty  in  locating 
the  responsibility  for  the  neglect  of  this  exceedingly  impor- 
tant point,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  command  of  that  island 
has  been  transferred  so  frequently  from  one  military  com- 
mander to  another,  between  the  time  that  the  Confederate 
Government  became  responsible  for  the  coast  defences  of 
North  Carolina,  and  the  attack  upon  the  island  upon  the 
7th  of  February,  1862.  That  Island,  upon  the  fall  of  Ilat- 
teras,  was  taken  possession  of  by  Colonel  Wright,  under 
the  instruction  from  Gen.  Huger,  and  the  principal  defences 
constructed  under  the  authority  and  directions  of  General 
linger,  who  assumed  jurisdiction  over  the  island,  although 
itwasAvithin  tlie  military  command  of  General  Gatlin.  Af- 
terwards Brigadier-General  D.  II.  Ilill  was  assigned  for 
a  short  time  to  the  immediate  command  of  that  post,  who 
immediately  entered  upon  his  duty,  made  an  examination  of 
the  defences  in  person,  and  was  making  active  preparations 
for  putting  the  island  in  a  state  of  defence,  wlien  he  was 
suddenly  superseded,  and  Brigadier-General  Branch  given 
the  command.  It  does  not  appear  in  evidence  that  General 
Branch  ever  visited  the  island  or  made  any  move  towards  its 
defence,  lie,  however,  was  superseded  by  Brigadier-General 
Wise  about  the  1st  of  January,  18G2,  who  immediately  pro- 
ceeded to  the  island  in  person,  aliout  the  Gth  of  January, 
spent  several  days  in  a  reconnoissance  of  the  island  and  its 
defences,  and  in  examining  the  adjacent  waters,  Avith  a  view 
of  constructing  obstructions  in  Croatan  Sound,  and  to  pre- 
vent the  passage  of  a  hostile  fleet,  and  from  that  moment  up 
to  the  7th  of  February,  the  committee  are  satisfied  that 
General  Wise  has  devoted  his  whole  time  in  a  zealous,  ener- 
getic and  indefatiga])lo  efibrt  to  place  that  island  in  a  state 
of  defence,  and  has  done  all  and  every  thing  in  his  power, 


11 

witli  tlie  means  lie  hail  at  liis  commauil,  to  effect  tliis  impor- 
tant object.  At  Norfolk,  on  the  2d  of  Januar}'-,  upon  his 
way  to  Roanoke  Island,  he  met  an  express  from  Colonel 
Shaw  (who  was  then  in  the  immediate  temporary  command 
of  the  island)  to  General  linger,  informing  him  of  the  de- 
fenceless state  of  the  island,  and  urging  the  necessity  of 
strengthening  Fort  Bartow  by  mounting  other  guns,  ob- 
structing Croatan  Sound  and  making  requisitions  for  am- 
munition, pile  driver  and  other  things  necessary.  General 
Wise  endorsed  and  approved  of  tlie  requisition  and  seconded 
the  demands  of  Colonel  Shaw.  General  Wise  arrived  at 
Roanoke  Island  upon  the  Gth  and  assumed  the  command  at 
that  post  upon  the  7th  of  January,  1862.  After  making  a 
reconuoisauce  of  the  island  and  its  defences,  General  Wise, 
on  the  loth  January,  informed  General  Huger  '*  that  Roa- 
noke Island  was  in  a  defenceless  condition  and  in  presence 
of  a  very  formidable  enemy's  force.  The  Burnside  expedi- 
tion is  reported  to  have  sailed.  Independent  of  that,  the 
force  now  at  Hatteras  Inlet  can  pass  or  take  Roanoke  Island, 
and  pardon  me  for  saying  that  I  respectfully  differ  from  ths 
opinion  you  expressed  in  your  orders  to-day,  that  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy's  gun-boats  from  passing  the  marshes  at  the 
south  end  will  also  prevent  any  landing.  Batteries  at  the 
marshes  are  vitally  essential  to  prevent  the  gun-boats  from 
passiiig  into  Croatan  Sound,  but  they  will  not  prevent  the 
landing  on  the  south  or  east  end  of  the  island.  At  least 
3iU)0  infantry  are  needed  on  the  island,  and  a  consiilerablc 
force,  say  loJl)  men,  are  needed  on  the  beaches,  and  if  the 
enemy  pass  Roanoke,  oUJiO  at  least  are  necessary  to  fight 
them  on  the  tongue  of  land  on  the  north  side  of  Albemarle 
Sound.  We  neeil  on  the  beach  and  on  the  island  at  least 
8  field  pieces  and  the  carriages  and  caissons  necessary.  We 
require  32  horses  for  the  artillery.  Wo  need  at  least  six 
heavy  pieces  at  the  south  end  marshes,  and  two  at  least  at 
Fleetwood  Point." 

On  the  same  day  General  Wise  addressed  the  Secretary 
of  War,  in  which  he  says  that  "  It  is  very  important  that 
my  Legion  shoiihl  be  forwarded  as  speedily  as  possible. 
The  defence  of  Roanoke  Island,  (which  is  the  key  of  all  the 
rear  defences  of  Norfolk,  and  its  canals  and  railroads)  is 
committeil  to  mv  charsre,  and  I  have  just  returned  from  a 
reeonnoisince  of  that  point.  It  is  now  utterly  defenceless. 
No  preparations  have  been  mule  there  at  all  adequate. 
General  linger  has  given  me  a  large  authority,  to  do  whu- 


12 

over  is  necessary,  and  has  advised  ^vllat  lie  deems  proper  in 
iny  command;  but  we  have  very  limited  means,  and  not  half 
time  enough  to  prepare  to  meet  an  enemy,  who  is  now  al- 
most in  immediate  presence,  in  very  formidable  force. 
Twice  the  number  of  my  Legion  is  necessary,  and  I  beg 
that  the  place  of  my  3d  Regiment  may  speedily  be  filled,  or 
tliat  it  may  be  restored." 

On  the  loth  January,  1SG2,  General  Wise  writes  to  the 
Tccretary  of  War,  "  I  am  sure  you  will  not  adjudge  me  im- 
portunate, when  I  inform  you  that  I  returned  from  Roanoke 
Island  to.  Norfolk  last  Saturday.  I  hasten  back,  after  a 
short  reconnoisance,  to  apprize  Headquarters  and  the  De- 
partment, that  there  are  no  defences  there  ;  no  adeiiuate  pre- 
paration whatever  to  meet  the  enemy,  and  to  forward  all  the 
means  in  my  reach  as  speedily  as  possible,  to  make  the  key 
of  all  the  rear  of  Norfolk,  with  its  canals  and  railroads, 
safe.  Inside  of  Ilatteras  Inlet  I  found  24  vessels  of  light 
draft,  eight  of  which  are  steamers,  said  to  carry  four  guns 
each.  They  are  at  farthest  but  3' I  miles  from  Roanoke  Is- 
land, and  can  reach  there  any  four  hours  or  less,  to  attack 
five  small  gun-boats,  under  Captain  Lynch,  and  four  small 
laud  batteries,  wholly  inefficient.  Any  boat  drawing  seven 
feet  water  or  less,  can  pass  the  Croatan  Sound  as  far  off  as 
one  and  a  quarter  miles  from  any  battery,  and  the  enemy's 
guns  can  silence  our  batteries  there  in  a  very  short  time. 
Neither  battery  is  casemated,  and  our  men  now  there  are 
untrained  to  heavy  pieces  mounted  on  navy  carriages.  The 
moment  the  enemy  passes  Croatan  channel,  the  North  Land- 
ing river.  North  river,  Pasquotank,  Chowan,  Roanoke,  Al- 
ligator and  Scuppernong  rivers,  and  the  Dismal  Swamp,  and 
Albemarle  and  Chjcsapeakc  canals  will  be  blockaded  effec- 
tually, and  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth  will  be  cut  off  from 
su])plies  of  corn,  pork  and  forage.  The  force  at  Ilatteras 
is  indejocndent  of  the  Burnside  expedition.  No  matter 
where  the  latter  is,  the  former  is  amply  sufficient  to  capture 
or  pass  Roanoke  Island  in  any  twelve  hours.  Let  me  say 
then,  sir,  that  if  we  are  to  wait  for  powder  from  Richmond, 
until  we  are  attacked  at  that  Island,  that  attack  will  be  cap- 
ture, and  our  defeat  will  precede  our  supply  of  ammunition. 
The  case  is  too  urgent  for  me  to  delay  speaking  this  out 
plainly  at  once."  And  in  another  part  of  the  same  letter 
he  says:  "We  want  ammunition  and  men.  In  a  word,  al- 
most every  preparation  has  to  be  made.  Delay  is  defeat 
now,  at  Roanoke  Island,  and  with  present  means  Captain 


13 

Lynch  and  I  combined  can't  guarantee  successful  defence 
for  a  day.  I  beg,  sir,  that  you  will  urge  this  upon  the  Navy 
Department,  and  believe  that  I  am  not  superserviceable  in 
this  urgency." 

General  Wise  finding  that  his  written  appeals  for  aid  in 
the  defences  of  the  Island,  to  Headquarters  at  Norfolk  and 
to  the  Department  at  Richmond,  were  neglected,  and  treated 
with  indifTerence,  repaired  in  person  to  Richmond,  and 
called  upon  the  Secretary  of  War  and  urged,  in  the  most 
importunate  manner,  the  absolute  necessity  of  strengthen- 
ing the  defences  upon  that  Island  with  additional  men,  ar- 
mament and  ammunition.  The  Secretary  of  War  replied 
verbally  to  his  appeals  for  reinforcements,  that  he  had  not 
the  men  to  spare  for  liis  command.  General  Wise  urged 
upon  the  Secretary  that  General  linger  had  about  15,0011 
men  in  front  of  Norfolk,  lying  idle  in  campfor  eight  months, 
and  that  a  considerable  portion  of  them  could  be  spared  for 
the  defence  of  the  rear  of  Norfolk,  and  especially  as  his 
(General  Wise's)  District  supplied  Norfolk  and  his  army 
Avith  nearly  or  quite  all  of  his  corn,  pork  and  forage.  That 
reinforcements  at  Roanoke  Island  were  as  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  the  defence  of  Norfolk,  as  forces  in  its  front,  and 
that  particular  or  special  posts  should  not  be  allowed  to  mo- 
nopolize nearly  all  the  men,  powder  and  supplies."  In  re- 
ply to  all  his  urgent  appeals  for  the  means  of  defence.  Gen- 
eral Wise  on  the  22d  January  received  the  following  mili- 
tary order,  No.  17  : 

"  Brigadier  General  Henry  A.  Wise,  Provisional  Army, 
will  immediately  proceed  to  Roanoke  Island,  North  Caroli- 
na, and  assume  command  of  the  Confederate  States  troops 
at  that  place. 

"  By  command  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"(Signed.)  John  Withers, 

"=  A.  A.  General."' 

It  is  apparent  to  the  Committee,  from  the  correspondence 
on  file  of  General  Wise,  Avith  the  Secretary  of  War,  Gene- 
ral Iluger,  his  superior  officer,  the  Governor  of  North  Car- 
olina, and  others,  proves  that  he  was  fully  alive  to  the  im- 
portance of  Roanoke  Island,  and  has  devoted  his  whole  time 
and  energies  and  means  to  the  defence  of  that  position,  and 
that  he  is  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  unfortunate  disas- 
ter which  befcd  our  forc:s  upon  that  Island  on  the  7th  and 
Sth  of  February. 

But  the  Committee  cannot  sav   the  same  in  reference  to 


14 

the  efforts  of  the  Secretary  of  "War  and  the  commanding 
officer  at  Norfolk,  General  linger.  It  is  apparent  that  the 
I&hmJ  of  Roanoke  was  important  for  the  defence  of  Nor- 
folk, and  that  General  linger  had  under  his  command  at  that 
point  upwards  of  15,(i()0  men,  a  large  supply  of  armament 
and  ammunition,  and  could  have  thrown  in  a  fe^Y  hours  a 
large  reinforcement  upon  Koanoke  Island,  and  that  himself 
and  the  Secretary  of  War  had  timely  notice  of  the  entire 
inadequacy  of  the  defences,  the  want  of  men  and  munitions 
of  war,  and  the  threatening  attitude  ol  the  enemy.  But 
General  linger  and  the  Secretary  of  War  paid  no  practical 
attention  to  those  urgent  appeals  of  General  Wise,  sent  for- 
ward none  of  his  important  requisitions,  and  permitted 
General  Wise  and  his  inconsiderable  force  to  remain  to  meet 
at  least  fifteen  thousand  men,  well  armed  and  equipped.  If 
the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Commanding  General  at  Nor- 
folk had  not  the  means  to  reinforce  General  Wise,  why  was 
lie  not  ordered  to  abandon  his  position  and  save  his  com- 
mand ?  But,  upon  the  contrary,  he  was  required  to  remain 
and  sacrifice  his  command,  with  no  means  in  his  insulated 
position  to  make  his  escape,  in  case  of  defeat. 

The  Committee,  from  the  testimony,  are  therefore  con- 
strained to  report,  that  whatever  of  blame  and  responsibility 
is  justly  attributable  to  any  one,  for  the  defeat  of  our  troops 
r,t  lloanoke  Island  on  the  Sth  of  February,  1862,  should 
attach  to  Major  General  B.  linger,  and  the  late  Secretary 
of  War,  J.  P.  Benjamin. 

All  of  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 

B.  S.  GAITIIER, 

Chainnan. 


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